Formal Automotive Security Analysis Of CAN XL (Georgia Tech, QCRI, Purdue)

<p>Researchers at Georgia Institute of Technology, Qatar Computing Research Institute, and Purdue University published a technical paper titled “A Formal Security Analysis of CAN XL.” Abstract Excerpt: &#8220;For decades, the Controller Area Network (CAN) has been the backbone of in-vehicle communication. As modern vehicles integrate cameras, LiDARs, and AI components, classic CAN (CAN CC) faces... <a class="read_more" href="https://semiengineering.com/formal-analysis-uncovers-security-flaws-in-can-xl-georgia-tech-qcri-purdue/">&#187; read more</a></p> <p>The post <a href="https://semiengineering.com/formal-analysis-uncovers-security-flaws-in-can-xl-georgia-tech-qcri-purdue/">Formal Automotive Security Analysis Of CAN XL (Georgia Tech, QCRI, Purdue)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://semiengineering.com">Semiconductor Engineering</a>.</p>