Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech)

<p>Researchers at Ruhr University Bochum, the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, and Georgia Tech published “Randomized Caches in Hardware: Challenges and Trade-offs.” Abstract Excerpt: &#8220;Randomized caches protect against side-channel attacks by obfuscating the mapping of memory addresses to cache locations. Existing proposals typically describe architectural behavior, leaving practical hardware implementation challenges largely unexplored.... <a class="read_more" href="https://semiengineering.com/randomized-caches-in-hw-overheads-and-limitations-rub-max-planck-georgia-tech/">&#187; read more</a></p> <p>The post <a href="https://semiengineering.com/randomized-caches-in-hw-overheads-and-limitations-rub-max-planck-georgia-tech/">Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://semiengineering.com">Semiconductor Engineering</a>.</p>